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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.519
20 July 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

GE.89-62516/0728B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 519th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Italy, the German Democratic Republic, Belgium and Romania. I take particular pleasure in welcoming to the Conference Ambassador Aldo Pugliese, an old friend, who will be addressing the plenary meeting today as representative of Italy. I now give the floor to Ambassador Pugliese.

Mr. PUGLIESE (Italy): Thank you, Mr. President, for the nice words you have addressed to me. At the outset, allow me to express to you my warmest congratulations upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for this month. I am fully confident that under your skilful and effective guidance the Conference will be able to achieve decisive progress in its deliberations. I also wish to extend my delegation's deepest appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, for the experienced and able manner in which he presided over the Conference on Disarmament during the month of June.

The Conference on Disarmament has resumed its activities at a time when disarmament prospects hold great promise and the international climate, in general, seems to favour a successful outcome of endeavours aimed at a drastic reduction of the military confrontation and at a consolidation of peace and stability.

In the context of the East-West dialogue, the recent summit of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels announced new proposals in the field of conventional force reductions, with the precise aim of imparting a new and decisive impulse to the CFE Vienna negotiations. Such proposals have already been introduced in treaty form, following the elaboration of some essential details, at the negotiating table in Vienna, two months in advance of what had been foreseen by the summit itself.

This is - in our view - another example of a definite willingness to promote the rapid achievement of concrete results in these negotiations, which hold exceptional importance for stability and peace in Europe and which have already allowed an unprecedented conceptual rapprochement in the mere four months since they started last March. Recently, the Soviet-United States negotiations on START and on space questions, and other bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR, have been resumed in a very constructive atmosphere, enhancing the prospects of conclusive developments in a not too distant future.

The Italian Government welcomes these developments and believes that they should constitute an encouragement for us to face our tasks with a renewed sense of commitment and with a firm will to succeed.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament has so far largely proved its effectiveness as a distinct multilateral laboratory of intents and concepts relevant to the disarmament process; our essential task is to go further and to address our efforts towards the achievement of decisive concrete results on extremely important issues which can influence the future of mankind itself.

It is thus imperative, in the light of the increasingly dynamic international framework, that the Conference on Disarmament live up to its real objectives and play a major role in providing a substantive contribution to the international disarmament process and to the search for strengthened stability and peace in the whole world.

Mr. Andreotti, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement here on 2 March, along with Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, stressed again the priority importance and the urgency that the Italian Government attaches to the conclusion of a convention on the total ban of chemical weapons.

In this context, I must clearly express Italy's strong wish that progress on this issue be much quicker than proved possible during our last session and that, therefore, our work may take on a faster pace and greater dynamism.

Indeed, after the success achieved by the Paris Conference, the call for an intensification of efforts for the achievement of early results has found particularly in Ambassador Morel's competent guidance and dedicated resolve the most reliable and committed interpretation of its requirements.

However, the stronger impetus imparted to the negotiations has not been rewarded so far by the corresponding substantial developments we were expecting. Whereas we feel that, while some progress on certain specific, quite significant, issues has been achieved, on the whole, not enough advance has been made, and most important issues remain unsolved.

Italy is concerned that we might lose the momentum to proceed towards the complete elimination of these hideous weapons and to prevent the existing risks of proliferation. We are firmly convinced in this regard that the only way to stop a possible catastrophic spread of chemical weapons is to conclude a total and global ban as soon as possible.

In this spirit we shall also participate in the Canberra conference, trusting that it will help to give a concrete turn to the efforts aimed at the conclusion of a chemical weapons ban and to a realistic comprehension of the background against which the convention is being elaborated.

With all appreciation for the many and useful national contributions on specific and highly detailed questions, we think that delegations should now try hard to concentrate and direct their efforts towards the solution of crucial issues that are still pending in the way of an early conclusion of negotiations. In spite of endless efforts to regulate in advance the future convention to the utmost detail, it might in fact prove illusory to aim at too

(Mr. Fugliese, Italy)

detailed perfection in the search for ideal solutions to extremely complex problems. The ban is bound to bear some kind of imperfection or other at the outset and will have to be submitted to a constant fine-tuning on the basis of subsequent implementation and experience: there should be no doubt that the same political will and sense of commitment that will allow the finalization of the convention should enable parties to co-operate to ensure full compliance.

Verification issues are clearly central to an effective ban and on many aspects they still present us with unsolved complexities. However, we are convinced that the definition of a reliable verification system along the lines identified through our work is not only possible, but even within reach, given the political will to overcome the remaining obstacles and a sufficient spirit of compromise. We are encouraged by the results of the trial inspections that have been carried out by various countries in the last few months, which, in our opinion, should contribute to a conclusive turn towards the solution of verification problems. Challenge inspections, in our view, will remain the essential element of a verification régime which is capable of deterring violations and establishing compliance.

We are certainly open to other suggestions and we have considered with interest the proposals of the United Kingdom and of the Federal Republic of Germany, envisaging additional means of verification. At the same time, we believe that the most urgent task is to concretely address the main aspects and to avoid academic debates that might distract our attention.

We also think that an advance data exchange with provisions for its verification will significantly contribute to a general increase of confidence and thus constitute an important element to facilitate the adoption of a ban.

In this context, Italy is heartened by the fact that a growing number of countries are taking a direct interest in the negotiations for a ban, which, to be really effective, must be supported by all countries concerned and - ideally - should be of a universal character.

We wonder whether it may be feasible to contemplate a methodological approach aimed at disposing of the solution of the most important issues in the shortest possible time while setting temporarily aside the cases of less vital character. These might indeed be tackled at a later stage. A prolonged lack of success in finalizing any instrument on the global prohibition of chemical weapons may in fact be interpreted as a failure in preventing an unchecked dissemination of militarily relevant chemical technologies around the world: a prospect casting an historic responsibility upon this body.

Another important element of the convention is certainly related to the institutional aspects. In fact, it will be essential, in the Italian view, to ensure a balanced and satisfactory representation in the organs which will have competence for implementing the convention and ensuring compliance.

Italy is convinced that universal and loyal participation in the future convention will only be ensured through a widespread feeling that all legitimate interests are protected through fair representation.

(Mr. Pugliese, Italy)

With this in mind, we believe, as regards participation in the executive council, for example, that it will have to be wide enough and to adequately reflect regional, political and industrial realities, with no provision for unjustified differentiated membership.

As regards other items on our agenda, allow me first of all to state the satisfaction of my delegation at the positive contribution provided by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) in devising a general and effective verification régime for the monitoring of seismic events. Unfortunately, we can hardly speak of any other significant progress on the three nuclear items on our agenda during the spring session. We support efforts currently being made by Ambassador Yamada of Japan to secure a consensus on a specific mandate for the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. It is regrettable that obstacles prevent more substantive activity from being carried out. Even in the absence of a negotiating mandate, the Conference could still make a useful contribution to the progress of this item.

My Government remains deeply committed to the final objective of a verifiable and comprehensive test ban, as one of the main issues on our agenda. We recognize, however, that a comprehensive test ban cannot be isolated from other issues concerning the disarmament process at large and the evolution of the strategic balance. Thus our support, as previously stated before this forum, goes to a step-by-step approach, favoured by a more flexible attitude by all members of the CD and assisted by progress achieved in the separate, but very relevant, forum of the United States-USSR negotiations on progressive limitation of their nuclear tests.

Lastly, in the field of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we welcomed the announced resumption of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva, on 19 June, on START and space matters; it is to be hoped that progress on all space-related items at a bilateral level will stimulate more substantive progress on the same item here at the CD: this may take place through the clarification of issues, such as a correct and uniform terminology, the relationship between bilateral and multilateral forums, improved access to information, the strengthening of the existing régime governing outer space, as well as the promotion of an appropriate set of confidence-building measures consistent with technological innovations.

In this framework, growing stability in space relationships can greatly benefit from closer co-operation also in the civil exploitation of space, given the close interconnection between the civil and military uses of outer space.

The military use of outer space poses serious problems of verification, but these are not impossible to solve: technical problems connected with verification procedures can be tackled when there is a strong political will. My delegation believes that significant progress can and should be achieved in the field of outer space verification and of the identification of means to ensure compliance with existing agreements.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): Already at the beginning of this month, I had an opportunity to set forth in detail our viewpoint on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As you know, the German Democratic Republic advocates that effective and verifiable agreements be concluded on the prohibition of the development, testing and deployment of weapons in outer space. On several occasions we have advanced proposals to this end. Today I should like to briefly touch upon another issue of the work of the Outer Space Committee, i.e. an analysis of existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The delegations of socialist countries have repeatedly elaborated on the special aspect of the protection of objects in outer space. Therefore I should like to submit to the Conference today on behalf of Bulgaria, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic a working paper CD/933 (CD/OS/WP.34) entitled "Survey of international law relevant to immunity and protection of objects in space and to other basic principles of outer space activities". This document shows in particular that the existing legal régime for outer space is adding to the protection of outer space objects. Against this background, it is crucially important that all States strictly comply with these agreements and apply their specific provisions. The working paper comprises a review of international law regarding immunity of objects in outer space. It is structured, as you will see, in the following manner: first - basic norms; second - norms concerning national jurisdiction over and ownership of objects after their launch into outer space; third - other main principles of activities in outer space. The survey contained in document CD/933 clearly indicates that the existing legal régime does not guarantee all-embracing protection of objects in outer space. Therefore, we think, additional measures are needed to this effect. What would also serve this aim is the further codification and development of existing rules of international law relating to the protection of space objects, which would constitute a major step towards preventing an arms race in outer space. These measures could encompass steps providing for confidence-building and for prohibiting the weaponization of outer space. In our opinion, these two aspects are interlinked.

So much for the introduction of the document before the Conference. I should like to add some other remarks.

During the last meetings of the Outer Space Committee it was possible to listen to interesting scientific contributions on the subject of arms control, which were delivered by outer space experts from the Soviet Union, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It has become obvious once more that the knowledge and expertise of experts is indeed helpful in this context. On the part of our delegation it is envisaged that an expert from the German Democratic Republic will address the meeting of the Outer Space Committee next week. As regards the involvement of experts in the work of the Outer Space Committee, we hold the view that tangible progress has been achieved in this

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

respect. The explanations made by experts have been substantial in nature and focused on expounding the proposals of their countries in a more detailed way. We would welcome it very much if in July 1990 delegations would facilitate the appearance of outer space experts. We feel that it would be suitable, in this connection, to co-ordinate the activities of experts and organize a direct exchange of opinion among them first. We think this could help to make the future work of the Outer Space Committee more concrete and more effective. As far as my delegation is concerned, we are prepared to make a distinctive contribution to this effect.

Mr. HOULLEZ (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, though I shall be speaking on behalf of the Group of Western States, I should like first of all, on behalf of the Belgian delegation, to express our profound satisfaction at seeing you presiding over our work. Your experience and your sense of diplomacy, conveyed so subtly thanks to your linguistic knowledge, will guarantee you success in your task.

I should also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, our doyen, Ambassador García Robles, for the remarkable way in which he guided our work.

Finally, I am particularly pleased, as a former Ambassador to Warsaw, to congratulate the Polish delegation on the occasion of their national day.

The delegations of the Western countries, on whose behalf I have the honour to speak today, have consistently stressed the special significance they attach to an in-depth consideration of the nuclear items on our agenda. This interest derives from the overriding necessity of avoiding war and strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age. The prevention of nuclear war is a global concern and not merely the responsibility of certain States or military alliances. Our current efforts in this regard take place at a time of unprecedented change and opportunity. Developments in East-West relations suggest that real progress is possible in the field of arms control and disarmament. The changes that are taking place in some regions are bringing us closer to the vision of a just, humane and democratic world. Western countries welcome increased openness, greater respect for human rights and active participation of the individual in shaping foreign policy. If sustained, these trends will strengthen the prospects for fundamental improvements in international relations, a prerequisite for real progress in the disarmament field.

The basic goal of Western arms control and disarmament policy is to strengthen security and increase stability at the lowest balanced level of forces and armaments consistent with the requirements for the prevention of war and for defence. Current prospects notwithstanding, we face an immediate future which is both promising and uncertain. Peace must always be striven for, it can never be taken for granted. With this background in mind, military security and policies aimed at reducing tension and resolving underlying political differences are not contradictory, but on the contrary complementary. In their determined efforts to reduce the relative importance of the military component and in trying to replace confrontation with co-operation, the Western countries will, both in East-West relations and

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globally, exploit the opportunities for arms control as an agent of change. We will spare no effort to ensure that these positive trends and developments result in greater security and stability for the benefit of all States. The Western countries members of the Atlantic Alliance adopted on 29 and 30 May a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which provides a way ahead in this respect and sets an agenda for the future. This concept, which was circulated as document CD/926, represents a comprehensive approach to the CD agenda items "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war including all related matters" as interrelated issues. The Western Group of countries believes that these issues can only be dealt with satisfactorily in a broader context of prevention of war in general. It is with this objective in mind that the Western countries are continuing their active and constructive approach to these items.

In the field of arms control we have already expressed our satisfaction about the progress made. The INF Treaty has eliminated a whole category of weapons, while providing for stringent verification measures. We reaffirm our desire for the conclusion as soon as possible of an agreement significantly reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear Powers by eliminating destabilizing offensive capabilities. Although the members of the Western Group are actively working for further progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, they nevertheless stress that in their view the reduction of nuclear arms cannot be fully dissociated from other disarmament measures and that it must take place within the context of a strengthening of international stability and security. In this respect they welcome with satisfaction the general improvement in relations between the two main nuclear Powers, their respective allies and other European States, which has led to the opening of negotiations on conventional disarmament and on confidence-building and security measures in Europe, on which they hope to see rapid progress. Agreements in this field and in the START negotiations already mentioned would constitute, both in themselves and through interaction among different arms control elements, major contributions to stability. The Western countries members of the Atlantic Alliance have stated that the implementation of such agreements could facilitate further reductions in substrategic nuclear forces, although it would not obviate the need for such forces. Once implementation of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe has begun, the way could be opened for negotiations on partial reductions in United States and Soviet land-based short-range nuclear missiles to equal and verifiable levels.

Noting that it is incumbent upon all States to intensify their efforts and take steps to promote disarmament, all members of the Group of Western countries observe with growing concern the acquisition or the development of ballistic missiles by an increasing number of States. The elimination of this potential source of international instability and insecurity would seem to call for action, whether at the bilateral, regional or international levels, especially if this development were to be accompanied by national nuclear programmes. Delegations of the Western Group consider that the establishment of a subsidiary body for item 2 is inappropriate at the present stage and that in current circumstances it would be better to work on the cessation of the

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nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in plenary and informal meetings. However, in our view the most appropriate tool for dealing with these problems is plenary debate, where views of delegations are put on final record.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the distinguished representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to associate myself with previous speakers in conveying to you our warmest congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and for your most able and dynamic conduct of our work so far during this month of July. In you, we hail a representative of a country with which Romania enjoys close links of friendship and co-operation as well as a diplomat and colleague whose experience and tact are well known to all.

Our congratulations go as well to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Alfonso Garcia Robles, for the exemplary manner in which he discharged his duties. I take this opportunity to express our best wishes for the future to those colleagues who have left us - Mario Campora of Argentina, Aldo Pugliese of Italy, Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Youri Nazarkin of the Soviet Union - and to assure them that our warm wishes go with them throughout their future career. It is a pleasure to welcome and greet an old friend whom we all esteem, in the person of Mr. Batsanov, the new representative of the Soviet Union to the Conference on Disarmament.

In the view of the Romanian delegation, the international community is entitled to expect more substantial results from the Conference on Disarmament. Firstly, while the international situation is still complex and contradictory, the fact remains that developments in international affairs, the progress made in the settlement of regional disputes, the signing of the Soviet-United States treaty on the elimination of medium and short-range nuclear missiles, followed by steps to implement it, and the beginning of the Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons are so many positive elements conducive to progress on the issues on the Conference's agenda. Secondly, there is no lack of competence and expertise in this forum. A large number of proposals and suggestions have been put forward with respect to the first item on the agenda, namely, "Nuclear-test ban". The draft submitted by Czechoslovakia remains on the table, and Ambassador Yamada of Japan is continuing his efforts to find a formula that is generally acceptable. In another sphere, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, after his remarkable efforts in preparing for the success of the Paris Conference, is continuing to show inexhaustible energy and imagination in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, thanks to various initiatives, including your own, Mr. President, we have got a better grasp of the substantive issues to be discussed and to be settled in the framework of a legal régime that could meet our aims. Finally, with respect to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I would

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

mention the remarkable efforts made by its distinguished Chairman, Ambassador García Robles. In this area as on other items on the agenda, many delegations of member and non-member countries have come forward with contributions or proposals of great interest and usefulness.

Despite all these efforts progress has been modest. We have repeatedly examined issues relating to the question of expanding the Conference's role and increasing its efficiency, but as we have already stressed, the fundamental problem in our view is still to find the political will necessary to give the multilateral forum its proper place in any disarmament process. A particular responsibility falls to the major nuclear powers in this respect, but the process cannot be sustained and carried to a successful conclusion without the involvement and active participation of all countries concerned. We too wish to emphasize the necessary complementarity of efforts in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres. It is high time for all our capitals to understand that the single multilateral forum this Conference represents ought not to be barred from dealing with certain subjects which are in fact central, such as nuclear disarmament. The Conference ought to be in a position to engage in substantive discussion and negotiations on all of the priority questions on its agenda, to play its role in full and to contribute very specifically to a real disarmament process.

Allow me now to make a few brief comments on certain aspects of our work that we consider particularly important and topical. One objective that is now accepted for ensuring international security and building lasting peace is the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and first and foremost, nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament first, because, by their power of destruction and the size of the existing arsenals, nuclear weapons today are capable of destroying mankind and civilization on our planet. Nuclear disarmament first, because so long as these arsenals exist the danger of sliding into disaster cannot be ruled out. Nuclear disarmament first, because we are talking about a threat that weighs upon the security of all States whether they possess nuclear weapons or not. Given this situation and despite the fact that there is more and more talk of the need for a new approach to problems of international security in disarmament, the concept of nuclear deterrence continues to provide the basis for the military doctrines of certain States. For our part we can only regret this situation and reiterate our firm conviction that nuclear weapons, far from assuring or consolidating the security of States, diminish and jeopardize it, because nuclear deterrence and the military doctrines associated with it in fact assume the possibility of using nuclear weapons and give rise to the steady qualitative and quantitative growth of nuclear arsenals. Trusting in nuclear deterrence and all that implies is one of the last clichés of the arms race. Like other clichés, it is doomed to disappear, but how long will we have to wait? If we compare present approaches with those which prevailed in previous decades we observe that disarmament in general, and nuclear disarmament in particular, apart from certain difficulties inherent in comparability and verification remains a problem of political will. As was pointed out by Ambassador Theorin of Sweden, it took 20 years from the signature of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for the nuclear Powers to take a first

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

step in fulfilling the undertaking they had assumed to continue their negotiations in good faith and implement effective nuclear disarmament measures. We share the view that mankind cannot afford the luxury of waiting another 20 years for the next step. Substantial steps aimed at the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons should take place at an ever faster pace so that mankind can hope to enter upon the next millenium without this sword of Damocles threatening its existence. Of course in the sphere of nuclear disarmament one can imagine various scenarios and priorities. Common sense would suggest acting simultaneously along several avenues, for the denuclearization of the European continent, the 50 per cent reduction in the strategic weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States and the cessation of all nuclear tests.

As far as tactical nuclear weapons are concerned, I would have two comments to make. The first is that nuclear arsenals are continuing to grow, and implementation of NATO's proposed decision to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons can only strengthen that trend. The second is that a conflict in Europe with the use of tactical nuclear weapons would lead not only to the destruction of the countries within the area of deployment on either side of the line separating the two blocs, but would also inevitably degenerate into a generalized nuclear exchange. This is why the NATO countries should seize the opportunity provided by the Soviet Union's recent proposal. In this context, I should like to remind you that my country has systematically spoken in favour of all measures which may ultimately be conducive to denuclearizing the European continent. Thus during the "missiles in Europe" crisis, Romania came out in favour of the withdrawal of the Soviet SS20s and the abandonment of the decision to deploy United States Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe. Then after the beginning of deployment of these missiles, my country appealed to both countries to show restraint, appealed to them not to take retaliatory measures and argued vigorously for measures of reciprocally acceptable de-escalation. At the same time we expressed the hope that Soviet-United States negotiations in Geneva would not be interrupted, and after they were that they should be resumed without preconditions. Our approach has not changed. It is therefore only logical that we should express our concern at the reservations of certain nuclear Powers that in fact oppose measures aimed at freeing the European continent from all nuclear weapons. The bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations on a 50 per cent cut in their strategic nuclear weapons are particularly important. The agreement on medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles was important especially because of the new approach it involved and its symbolic value in eliminating a whole category of nuclear weapons. But a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals would mark a decisive commitment to nuclear disarmament and would be likely to accelerate the disarmament process as a whole.

As for the prohibition of nuclear tests, I must reiterate our basic position, which is that in conditions where the existing nuclear arsenals are enough to destroy mankind, there can be no justification for continuing these tests. To pursue nuclear tests is not only to heap new burdens on the present and future of mankind and to open up new and possibly irreparable wounds in our fragile environment, it is also to consolidate the material basis for a continued and accelerated arms race, for the creation of new types and new

(Mr. Dolgu, Romania)

systems of weapons, which could cancel out the effects of nuclear weapon reductions. In our view, the continuation of nuclear testing is at odds with the spirit and the letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and can only weaken the credibility of that Treaty. It is an element that we must bear in mind with a view to the 1990 conference, and especially the fifth review conference in 1995, meetings that will be decisive for the fate of this international legal instrument. The initiative to convene an international conference to amend the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear tests in the three environments by extending this ban to tests underground already enjoys the support of 40 States including Romania. The conditions for convening such a conference have thus been met. This demonstrates a strong political will and increasing insistence by the international community that nuclear tests must be permanently banned. We cannot share the doubts expressed here as to the timeliness and validity of this initiative, because it is not likely to hamper the performance by the Conference on Disarmament of its role, and even less the achievement of the specific mandate entrusted to it. Like other delegations, we see in this a complementarity, not a substitution. It goes without saying that the success of the Conference requires adequate preparation both in terms of substance and in terms of organization so that it may make a positive and clear contribution to the disarmament process. As to the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation continues to favour debates on substance and negotiations within an appropriate working structure created on the basis of the proposals put forward under the Conference's first agenda item, "Nuclear-test ban". It ought to be possible to have structured debates, if not negotiations, within the appropriate working structure on the other two points of the agenda concerning nuclear issues.

Romania participates with the other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the members of NATO and other countries of Europe in the Vienna negotiations on a radical reduction in conventional weapons under strict international control, and remains determined to make its contribution to the achievement of an agreement as soon as possible. Our country firmly favours a reduction of at least 50 per cent in these weapons and a balance between the two blocs which rules out any possibility of military aggression. Under present circumstances the fundamental problem of international life remains for us the abandonment of nuclear weapons and of the programme for their modernization, the achievement of new agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on a 50 per cent reduction in offensive nuclear weapons and a general agreement on the total liquidation of nuclear weapons. It is necessary that all States give up nuclear tests forthwith, that they give up militarization of space, that we reach an appropriate agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons in close relationship with the elimination of nuclear weapons. Likewise we firmly favour a reduction in military expenditure, by at least 50 per cent in an initial stage, with the financial resources thus released being used to meet various economic and social needs of the countries in question as well as to support the developing countries.

To conclude, I wish to quote the words of the President of my country, Nicolae Ceausescu: "Socialist Romania is firmly resolved to participate actively in the achievement of disarmament, in the establishment of new international relations that rule out force and the threat of force."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement and for his kind words about me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during next week. As you will notice, provision is made for the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which starts its twenty-eighth session on 24 July. The timetable for other meetings has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On that understanding, I suggest that we adopt the informal paper.

It was so decided.

You will recall that, at the end of the informal meeting held by the Conference last Tuesday, we agreed that any member wishing to advance a proposal relating to the forthcoming Third Review Conference of the Sea-bed Treaty should signify that wish to me, so that we might meet again in informal meeting this morning, to allow the delegation or delegations concerned to present their suggestions and other delegations to express views on them, if necessary. I wish to inform you that I have not received any requests for consideration today at an informal meeting on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Accordingly, there will be no need to hold such a meeting today.

As I have no other business for today, I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 25 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.520
25 July 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

GE.89-62619/0814B

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 520th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". However, under rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Romania and Poland. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Dolgu.

Mr. DOLGU (Romania) (translated from French): As you know, a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, took place in Bucharest on 7 and 8 July. The decision was taken that my country, as the host country, should be entrusted with the task of circulating the documents of the Meeting, to this Conference on Disarmament among others, as official documents of the Conference. The communiqué of the Meeting and the document entitled "For a stable and secure Europe free of nuclear and chemical weapons, for a substantial reduction of armed forces, armaments and military spending", which will be circulated shortly, speak for themselves. They constitute an appeal to the member countries of NATO, to the other States in the world, to act together in order to establish a new policy of peace, co-operation and perfect equality of rights that will guarantee the free and independent development of all nations. On behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, I have the honour to submit these documents to you today.

At Bucharest the participants in the Meeting held an exchange of views on developments in the international situation and discussed the main directions of action by the allied States in the interests of the consolidation of peace and stability in Europe, of disarmament and of a broader international co-operation and dialogue. It was noted that owing to the active policy of the socialist countries and to the activities of all peace-loving and realistic forces, there had been certain positive developments in international affairs - the lessening of tension and confrontation, confidence-building, a development of political dialogue and greater contacts between States at various levels. The first steps have been taken in disarmament, a control mechanism has been created and is functioning effectively. The beginning of the Vienna negotiations is encouraging. Co-operation is broadening in the economic, technical, scientific and human rights fields. Progress has been made in the political settlement of regional conflicts. There is a growing readiness on the part of the international community to co-operate in the field of security and in solving global issues.

Nevertheless the world situation continues to be complex and contradictory, since the favourable processes have not yet become irreversible. The build-up of weapons and their modernization has not stopped. Nuclear tests continue, as does work on the militarization of outer space. The concepts of confrontation, of reliance on force, born in the years of the "cold war", are being overcome with difficulty. The nuclear-deterrence

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strategy, reaffirmed at the recent session of the NATO Council, is a dangerous anachronism, one which runs counter to the interests of general security. The practice of interference in the domestic affairs of other States and attempts to destabilize them, as well as human rights violations continue.

The participants in the Meeting confirmed the attachment of their States to the ideal of ridding mankind of the danger of war by doing away with nuclear and chemical weapons and drastically reducing conventional weapons. They consider disarmament the cardinal issue of our time, the decisive factor for strengthening peace, security and confidence, deepening détente, developing broad international co-operation and solving global problems. The States represented at the Meeting reaffirmed their determination to do their utmost to reach new agreements in the sphere of disarmament, which should become a continuous and irreversible process.

They declared themselves resolutely in favour of ensuring security not by military but by political means, affirming the primacy of international law in inter-State relations, maintaining normal relations and developing co-operation between States irrespective of their social and political systems, renouncing the policy of confrontation and hostility in favour of one of partnership, mutual understanding, mutual confidence and goodneighbourliness in the interests of all States and all peoples, and co-operating in the sphere of human rights and in the humanitarian field in keeping with the obligations assumed by States. The Bucharest documents note that the promotion of a policy of security, mutual understanding and co-operation among States requires strict respect for national independence and sovereignty, for the equal rights of peoples and the right of each people to self-determination and to a free choice of its path of social and political development, non-interference in others' internal affairs, unconditional renunciation of the use or threat of force in whatever form, the settlement of any disputes between States exclusively by peaceful means, strict respect for today's territorial and political realities, the inviolability of existing borders and the territorial integrity of States, the implementation in every country of human rights and fundamental freedoms in their entirety for all irrespective of race, sex, language, religion or nationality, the development of co-operation between States in various fields on the basis of mutual advantage, conscientious fulfilment of obligations under international law, observance of all the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and all other generally recognized rules of international relations.

In the context of the growing interdependence of today's world, the implementation of all of these principles and provisions will help to consolidate common human values and rules of conduct in international relations. Basing themselves upon the need for a global approach to problems of security, the participants in the Meeting called for security to be achieved through the maintenance of the military balance at the lowest level, sufficient only for defence and excluding the posisibility of sudden attack or the conduct of large-scale offensive operations. The objective aimed at by the States parties is the reduction of armaments to a level which completely eliminates the threat of an outbreak of war.

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The participants are ready to continue to seek, together with all interested countries, agreements leading to the progressive reduction and subsequently to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the radical reduction of conventional armed forces, the prevention of an extension of the arms race into outer space, the gradual curtailment of military production and the substantial reduction of military spending. In that connection, they proceed from the assumption that disarmament measures must ensure equal security for all States with strict respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of every State within its existing borders, and must exclude the possibility of the use of force or the threat of force in inter-State relations.

Expressing their satisfaction at the resumption of Soviet-United States negotiations on major disarmament issues, the allied States express the hope that they will soon lead to practical results. They consider one of the priority objectives to be the completion of work on the treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in the offensive strategic weapons of the USSR and the United States subject to observance of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. The States represented at the Meeting called for the immediate cessation of nuclear tests and for detailed examination of this question, including examination at the multilateral level, at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. They called for the rapid finalization of the verification protocols to the Soviet-United States agreements of 1974 and 1976 and for the entry into force of these agreements as a step towards the complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty support the idea of the possible extension to underground tests of the applicability of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear tests in three environments as one of the ways of speedily achieving the prohibition of all nuclear tests. The participants in the Meeting expressed their concern at the danger to peace and international security represented by the use of chemical weapons, as long as they exist and spread. The participants call for the speedy preparation of an international convention on the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

A key question of security and stability in Europe, in the view of the participants, is the reduction of conventional armed forces and weapons, the reduction and subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and confidence-building on the continent. The participants felt that the immediate objective of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe was to arrive, as previously agreed, at collective ceilings, which will be the same for both the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States, on the number of troops and the quantities of the main types of armaments in Europe and its various regions. The new levels would be significantly lower than the lowest levels of either side at present. The proposals made in this regard by the allied socialist countries in Vienna provide for a drastic mutual reduction of troops and armaments. This would also solve the problem of eliminating the existing imbalances in conventional weapons. These reductions and limitations of armed forces and armaments should take place under strict international control.

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At the Meeting it was noted that additional proposals relating to conventional forces in Europe submitted at the recent summit meeting of the NATO Council constituted a movement towards the position of the allied socialist countries. The participants in the Meeting expect that these proposals will be detailed and submitted at the Vienna negotiations in the near future. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reaffirmed their determination to do everything possible for the speedy achievement of results at the Vienna negotiations and expressed the view that the situation at the talks was now such that, given a constructive approach by all participants, it would be possible to arrive at initial arrangements as early as 1990.

In the declaration it is stressed that the practical steps taken by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in implementation of their defensive doctrine for unitilateral reduction of their armed forces and armaments, giving them an obvious non-offensive structure and reducing armaments production and military spending, are aimed at the creation of material and political conditions for a steady continuation of the arms limitation process and a lowering of the level of military confrontation. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty expect the NATO countries to take similar steps with respect to their armed forces, armaments, military expenditure and military activities. The participants in the Meeting called for the observance of the Stockholm agreements, the adoption at negotiations among the 35 States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on confidence- and security-building measures of new measures designed to develop them, and the extension of notification, observation and limitation measures to all States' military activities, including the activities of their naval and air forces. The establishment of a centre for reducing the military danger and preventing a surprise attack in Europe, a body with informational and consultative functions, could make an important contribution to building confidence and security and increasing stability on the continent. A major step, capable of raising the process of disarmament and of strengthening European security to a qualitatively new level could be the convening of a meeting of the leaders of the 35 States participating in the CSCE at which the results achieved on the continent in these fields would be examined and future tasks determined.

The participants felt that stability and security in Europe could not be fully reliable without a solution of the problem of tactical nuclear weapons. It is beyond doubt that as conventional weapons are reduced, the destabilizing effect of tactical nuclear weapons will inevitably increase. In this respect, the declaration stresses that NATO's plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons are causing great concern. Noting a certain development in the positions of the NATO countries with respect to the negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty call on these countries to solve the problem of tactical nuclear weapons not by modernization but by separate negotiations, aimed at their step-by-step reduction. They reaffirmed their proposal made in that regard. The participants in the meeting expressed their support for the Soviet Union's intention to proceed to further unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe if the NATO countries were prepared to begin negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. The participants in the Meeting also supported the Soviet Union's decision to unilaterally withdraw 500 warheads for tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of allied

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socialist States this year as well as its declaration that it is prepared to withdraw all nuclear weapons from the territory of its allies during the period 1989-1991 on condition that the United States takes a similar step.

Referring to the role of naval forces and their armaments and naval activities capable of exerting a destabilizing influence on the situation and creating a threat to security in Europe and other regions, the participants in the meeting advocated a more active dialogue on the problems and considered it necessary to begin separate negotiations for their consideration between the States concerned and first of all, between the major naval Powers. It was emphasized that a reduction in military spending allows the resources released to be directed to the needs of economic and social development. Accordingly, an effective solution to the problem of reconverting from military production acquires importance, and that might become the subject of international consultations, including consultations within the framework of the United Nations. Stress was also placed on the importance of joint and individual initiatives for promoting the solution of security problems in various regions of the continent. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty consider that disarmament measures must be accompanied by appropriate measures to ensure strict and effective control. They are prepared to join in the most effective solutions leading to the creation of a comprehensive system of disarmament control. A positive role could be played in this connection by the United Nations.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reiterate their appeal to the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to utilize the opportunities now emerging to overcome all the consequences of the "cold war" in Europe and worldwide. The participants in the Meeting expressed support for the idea that relations between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance should evolve along non-confrontational lines, for the establishment of a constructive dialogue between them on political and military matters, for the development of that dialogue into a factor for security and co-operation on the continent. They maintained the position of principle of the Warsaw Treaty countries in favour of ridding Europe of military blocs, simultaneously disbanding both alliances and eliminating their military organizations as a first step. The strengthening of peace and security in Europe would contribute to the solution of many serious social problems faced by the peoples of the continent, thus guaranteeing their right to life and to work.

The participants in the Meeting stressed the need to give a firm rebuff to any manifestations of revanchism and chauvinism, to any attempts to sow discord among peoples. They share the concern of public opinion in the Western European countries by all manifestations of neo-fascism in those countries.

The allied socialist States attach prime importance to ensuring military, political and territorial stability in Europe. They start from the fact that each people has the right to determine its own country's future, to choose its own socio-political and economic system, the State system it thinks fit. There can be no single standard for the organization of society. Stability presupposes a renunciation of confrontation, and the policy of force and a rejection of direct or indirect interference in others' internal affairs. No country has the right to dictate events in another country, to set itself up

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as arbiter and judge. The meeting was in favour of strengthening the solidarity and co-operation of the allied States and further developing their multilateral co-operation on the basis of equal rights and mutual respect for the benefit of their peoples of these countries and in the interests of universal peace. It was decided to continue efforts to strengthen the political character of the Warsaw Treaty and to improve the machinery for co-operation under the Treaty on a democratic basis. The participants in the Meeting informed one another about developments in their countries, about the progress and problems of socialist construction. They stressed the strong influence of socialist ideas, the importace of the changes taking place in the allied States aimed at improving and renewing socialist society, giving a new dynamism to its political and economic system, developing democracy, raising the standard of living and improving the quality of life for their peoples, promoting the self-realization of each individual, and safeguarding fundamental human rights and freedoms. They base themselves on the idea that there is no universal model of socialism, that no one has a monopoly of the truth. The building of a new society is a creative process which proceeds in keeping with the traditions, the specific conditions and the needs of each country. The participants reiterated their common desire to work in the interests of socialism and of improving collaboration between the allied States and preserving their lasting security. They expressed confidence in the capacity of the socialist States and the leading forces in society to resolve the problems that had arisen at the present stage of their development. The need was also stressed to develop relations among them on a basis of equality, independence and the right of each of them to work out its own political policy, strategy and tactics without outside interference.

To conclude, I should like to stress that the efforts of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty continue to have as their central goal the task of ensuring stability in Europe and the consolidation of a new type of relations on the continent, based on the elimination of confrontation and the strengthening of confidence and goodneighbourliness. The participants are in favour of broad co-operation on a mutually advantageous basis in a variety of areas and of the participation of all countries and peoples in settling the pressing problems of the continent. The common European process remains a key element in the construction of the new Europe.

These are some of the chief ideas in these important documents that I recommend to your attention.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement, and now I have the pleasure to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, allow me to express my particular pleasure at taking the floor under your presidency. You represent a brotherly socialist country with which Poland enjoys close and friendly relations. Your personal experience and skill are greatly contributing to the smooth proceeding of our work. I assure you of my delegation's fullest support.

Let me also express my gratitude to your predecessor in the Chair, Ambassador García Robles, for all his efforts to move our work forward. I would also like to extend my warm welcome to all the new colleagues who have

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joined us in the Conference on Disarmament during this session and to assure them of my personal and my delegation's full co-operation. To their predecessors, I extend our best wishes for success in their new assignments.

In my today's statement I should like to concentrate on the chemical weapons ban. The Conference on Disarmament has started this year's consideration of this agenda item in very favourable conditions created by the successful conclusion of the Paris Conference. One hundred and forty nine countries expressed in the form of a final declaration their unequivocal demand for the conclusion at an early date of a convention aimed at total elimination of all chemical weapons. The Paris Declaration contains something we have been seeking for so long - clearly expressed political will, which is a decisive prerequisite for progress in our negotiations. This fresh political impetus generated by Paris was accompanied by the creative and competent guidance of the present Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel. And, indeed, important steps were undertaken to intensify the pace of negotiations. I wish to pay our tribute also to Ambassador Morel's closest collaborators in this endeavour, the chairmen of the five working groups.

An organizational restructuring of the Committee aroused expectations of fulfilling the mandate of the Paris Conference to concentrate our redoubled efforts on resolving expeditiously the remaining unsolved issues. This approach offered additional opportunities to enter into the decisive stage of our negotiations towards finalizing the convention. Did we take full advantage of these opportunities? It is very difficult to give a fully satisfactory answer.

Undoubtedly, in the course of long years of negotiation we have made considerable progress. Ten years have passed since the year when an ad hoc subsidiary body for chemical weapons was established for the first time. It has been re-established in each of the subsequent years. We have been through several stages in the process of negotiations on the convention: starting from identifying its scope, outlines and structure, shaping its skeleton, through consecutive steps of fleshing it out with appropriate formulas reflecting the positions of the negotiators on different aspects of the convention, particularly on the scope of obligations, their substance and their structure, on different types, measures and mechanisms of verification of compliance with the convention, and on legal, technological, economic and financial aspects of the implementation process and its consequences. The present "rolling text" in fact contains agreed substantive material and an inventory of negotiator's positions on all envisaged articles of the convention. They differ in the degree of detail or in the scale of convergence. Nevertheless, we have a clear picture of the various problems and their ingredient elements, even those which need further elaboration or on which divergences still exist. We call them "outstanding issues".

The harvest of 10 years of the Committee's work is really rich and significant. It is especially so in view of the complexity of the subject of the negotiation, unprecedented from the point of view of its scope as well as the number of participants. What is more, in many cases the output of our work actually exceeds the requirements of the process of drafting the convention. The collected material can not only be used for the elaboration

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of the draft text of the convention, but will be valuable in creating the necessary understanding for a process of preparing for its entry into force as well as during the whole implementation period. A question arises whether this collected material constitutes a sufficient basis for the final draft of the convention. I think that in principle the answer could be positive.

What do we have at our disposal now? Firstly, clearly expressed political will; secondly, statements of position by negotiators on all the principal problems and, to a large extent, on specific aspects of the draft, including technical details; thirdly, a large convergence in the positions of the negotiators, extensive areas of agreement; fourthly, awareness of existing loopholes, their scale and interrelationships existing between them; fifthly, necessary negotiating experience gathered during these 10 years; sixthly, well-disposed attitude of the chemical industry to the convention; seventhly, effective engagement of various scientific and research institutes in the search for possible solutions to different technical problems; eighthly, pressure of world public opinion, justifiably concerned on well-known grounds. Then what is lacking? The answer is not so easy. We can assume that each of us has his own recipe for speeding up the process of negotiations. These recipes have been put forward in this forum. To various remarks presented here I would like to add just one, and in the form of a question - are the methods applied in our negotiations during the last three or four years adequate to the present advanced stage of negotiations? Or to put it in another way - whether penetrating more deeply into different problems - so to say, entering further into the forest, we do not concentrate too much of our attention on discovering and studying wonderful new trees. Could we not start in the coming session with sorting them out and selecting only those which are necessary as elements to be used in raising our building? After all, not all of these wonderful trees we come across are suitable and in fact necessary for our construction. Otherwise we can be lost in the forest.

Let me illustrate this with an example of the complex problem of verification. In the course of the process of negotiations we have made considerable progress. Exchanges of views on this subject during the present session, both in plenary meetings and in Group 1 of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as during very intensive consultations of the Chairman of the Committee, have contributed further to this progress. We are also looking forward to the results of the eleventh round of USSR-United States bilateral consultations.

Taking into account the scale of progress, should not we ask whether our efforts to finalize negotiations on outstanding technical and procedural elements of the process of verification would not be facilitated if we tried to approach them from the point of view of their place and functions in a general pattern of verification? To reach an understanding on such a pattern is - I firmly believe - the crucial point for us now. This understanding could possibly help us to realize more clearly the borderline between the necessary level of guarantees to ensure that there is no breach of the convention and the level of intrusiveness of the envisaged systems and types of verification. To the same extent it could enable us to see the necessity of a proper balance between the required level of effectiveness of verification and its costs, as well as the preservation of confidentiality to

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meet the requirements of the chemical industry's interests. This approach, it seems, could also help us to find the proper place in the verification system as a whole for one of the outstanding verification issues, namely, the most relevant production capabilities.

Let me add a brief comment on this very issue. It becomes evident that concentrating upon the most relevant chemicals does not automatically ensure that the capabilities are covered. During one of the industrial experts' meetings an interesting sentence was uttered: "The modern chemical facility which cannot produce a tabun is just not a modern one." It is not difficult to imagine that possible breach is more likely in undeclared facilities than in declared. It is therefore important to consider possible measures to cover at least to some extent facilities that do not produce or process any of the scheduled chemicals but pose a risk to the convention. In this very context we are also prepared to discuss further the United Kingdom's proposal for ad hoc inspections.

I should like to take another example from a different part of the "rolling text" - namely, articles X and XI. We are to try here another approach, namely, to narrow different views towards reaching a compromise solution. We can use here in this context a rule of logic which draws a kind of measure from the purpose. Although these articles deal with rights and obligations of States in two different spheres, their common function should be to stimulate positive interest in the convention so as to ensure its universality. We are to look for a solution of the divergences so clearly exposed in the text such as could make possible a compromise between the need to make the convention attractive and the desire of States to keep their chemical industries competitive.

Another element which is to be taken into consideration in our negotiations is the need for a cautious approach to the "rolling text". It is troubling that there should be more and more frequent returns to consideration of tentatively agreed parts of the text, returns which are justified neither by a change of position on a given aspect nor by progress on another, related part of the text. I would not like to be interpreted as implying that my delegation is wholly against renewed discussion on provisions on which convergence of views has been achieved. Nevertheless, at this stage of negotiations it is preferable not to take a step back if it would not result in making two steps ahead, so as to have at least a step-by-step progress. Otherwise we contribute ourselves to prolongation of the negotiating process.

I have touched upon only some aspects of agenda item 4. My delegation strongly believes that conditions have been created to undertake decisive efforts on this issue. I fully agree with all preceding speakers who have expressed their concern that we might lose momentum towards achieving the complete elimination of chemical weapons. There are legitimate reasons for critical assessment of the pace of negotiations on this item. The more so as in the rather quiet waters of our Conference the negotiations on this agenda item constitute a kind of "island of hope" for the Conference not to be in the deep arrière-garde of present disarmament efforts. It is an "island of hope" because an agreement seems to be within reach and because one can expect a positive impact of this agreement on other parts of our agenda.

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At the end of my statement let me turn briefly to the more general question of the effective and improved functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. This issue has been occupying our minds for a long time. In present circumstances, however, it is becoming more and more urgent. My delegation regrets that the Conference has not been able to undertake a serious discussion on this subject during this session.

There is a significant transformation of the traditional pattern and atmosphere in East-West relations. Confrontation is giving way to co-operation. Ideological differences are yielding to growing understanding of common responsibility for our common future. Substantial positive changes have appeared in many regional conflicts which for a long time had been a source of tension and mistrust. The United Nations is becoming an efficient instrument in resolving these regional conflicts. There is a visible improvement in its peace-keeping potential. Increased confidence in the United Nations system is creating new opportunities for further co-operative efforts. New rounds of European negotiations on the reduction of forces and armaments and on confidence- and security-building measures seem to open up a new and promising chapter for this continent. Last but not least, experience of the INF treaty negotiations and its implementation encourage high hopes for a positive outcome to the crucial bilateral United States-USSR talks. Significant changes have appeared not only in the practice of international disarmament negotiations but in the very approach to this problem. A revolution in our thinking about verification issues, traditionally a stumbling block in many disarmament endeavours, is a good example of this point.

Comparing these developments with our results we must very seriously ponder upon the place and role of this Conference in the major processes at present taking place in the world. Let me add to this that there is also a great disproportion between the outcome of our efforts and the political will demonstrated in our debate; between the slow progress of our work and the great diplomatic and intellectual potential gathered in our Conference, represented by highly qualified diplomats surrounding this table and the many highly experienced experts present in or visiting our delegations. This situation does concern my Government. In fact, "time is working against us" - as the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jaroszek, stressed in April this year in this hall. The inability to make any visible and concrete progress not only contributes to growing concern on the part of public opinion, but - let us honestly face this fact - undermines the credibility of this forum.

The intention of these remarks is not to drive us to despair but rather to stress the need for a candid and sober look at our Conference. What can be done to prevent it from being moved to the margin of world politics? How to ensure that this Conference responds better to new situations, new opportunities and requirements? My delegation strongly believes that the issue of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference deserves our serious consideration and should stay permanently on the agenda of our formal and informal consultations, both here and in our capitals, before the end of this session as well as in the forthcoming break.

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Let me present to you some considerations of my delegation related to only one aspect of this question. Taking into account the importance of the questions discussed at the Conference our principal aim should remain the elaboration of new agreements establishing international legal obligations upon States. Because of the complexity of those problems, their delicacy and their direct impact on the security of States, this work is - and will continue to be - laborious and time-consuming.

This basic approach need not, however, prevent the Conference from undertaking other measures, particularly in situations where the stage reached in negotiations or other considerations could make them advisable and the only ones feasible. Different situations may require different approaches and responses. And one of these responses could be confidence- and security-building measures. They must not necessarily have the character of legal instruments, but should reflect political commitment and provide some political guidance, which, if followed, would prompt further co-operation in the matters under consideration and facilitate further discussion. Such measures could, for example, be registered and approved by the Conference as a part of its annual reports.

The CD rules of procedure provide that negotiations can be conducted on draft treaties and other draft texts. They provide also that reports of the Conference can contain inter alia conclusions, decisions and other relevant documents. Thus, there is nothing to prevent the Conference from agreeing on some documents which are not intended to be treaties yet, but which - when it becomes possible - could evolve into, or be part of, binding international rules. This approach could make our work more flexible and more productive. One can assume also that a growing number of such measures will have an important impact on international confidence and security and help in our treaty-making endeavours, which remain of course our main responsibility.

The Polish delegation notes with attention increasing interest at this Conference in this category of measures. CSBMs have played a useful role in other international negotiations, particularly in the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We believe that they can also make our Conference a more flexible and live instrument, responding better to different needs and allowing it to use all opportunities to make its contribution to international peace and security. Having this in mind, my delegation has proposed for further consideration a set of measures related to our discussion on prevention of an arms race in outer space.

To conclude, Poland is strongly attached to this forum of disarmament negotiations. We consider the Conference as an important and, in fact, indispensable instrument of world-wide disarmament efforts. It has proved its usefulness and there are important tasks before it. We understand the complexity of issues on its agenda. We believe, however, that to solve them more determined efforts are needed. If we are not able to undertake such efforts, there will be growing frustration inside this Conference and increasing criticism from outside.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement and for his kind words about my country and the presidency.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak? That does not seem to be the case. There are no more matters to be considered today, and I shall therefore adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be on Thursday, 27 July, at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CD/PV.521
27 July 1989

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 July 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Luvsandorjiin Bayart (Mongolia)

GE.89-62666/1177a

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 521st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4 entitled "Chemical weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Norway and Chile. I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Huslid.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference for the month of July. I am confident that your skill and experience will guarantee efficient leadership of our negotiations during this month.

I am not going to make a policy statement today, as State Secretary Helga Hernes did so at the end of the spring session. My contribution will be limited to the presentation of two working papers which have been circulated to delegations. One of these, CD/936, deals with verification of alleged use of chemical weapons and contains the main result of the past year's research at the Division for Environmental Toxicology of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment at Kjeller, near Oslo. The other, CD/935, deals with verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and gives an account of recent developments in the Norwegian seismic verification programme. Both of these documents concern research programmes which have been the subject of Norwegian contributions to this Conference for quite some time.

The working paper on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons gives a summary of this year's research report, which will be presented to the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in the near future.

This year the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment introduced a new technique of analysis for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This is known as the headspace gas chromatography technique, which permits analysis directly on samples without prior cleaning procedures. Based on this simplified method, research is being continued with a view to further developing procedures to be followed by an international inspection team.

In 1989 the research has focused on the application of this new technique. Two series of field trials have been carried out: one in February, the other in June. In the first exercise, four different sample materials were contaminated with 1 mg each of the nerve agents sarin and soman and left outdoors for exposure to the prevailing weather conditions. Samples were collected for analysis at different time intervals in order to get an idea of the deterioration rate of the agents. In the second exercise the number of agents was increased to five: tabun, sarin, soman, mustard gas and diisopropyl methylphosphonate. The number of sample materials was increased to 10. Analysis was carried out after two and four weeks. A separate exercise was conducted to evaluate the influence of various temperatures during the transport of samples.

I will not go into the results of these experiments here, as that would go too far, but will confine myself to referring to the working paper and the

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

research report. In this context, I would like to underline the close link between this research programme and the negotiations on article IX of the chemical weapons convention. Together with Canada, Norway has, as you know, submitted a proposal for a text concerning general procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons as an annex to this article (document CD/766 of 2 July 1987). In the light of the progress in the negotiations on the guidelines for the International Inspectorate, the time should now be ripe for a discussion on how the specific problems concerning verification of alleged use should be incorporated into the convention.

Before leaving the subject of our negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, I would like to inform the Conference that the Norwegian authorities intend to carry out a national trial inspection of a production facility towards the end of the year.

Since 1982 Norway has been contributing to the work of the Conference on Disarmament on seismological verification measures for a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In particular, these documents have addressed various aspects of a future global system for international exchange of seismic data as envisaged by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Norway has consistently maintained that such a global system must take advantage of the rapid, ongoing technological developments in seismic instrumentation, data communication and computer systems. We therefore welcome the consensus which has now been reached on this issue in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). I refer you to the recently published fifth report by that Group (CD/903). This report, which marks yet another milestone in the work of the GSE, describes how recent technological and scientific developments can be applied in designing a modern international seismic data exchange system. The aim of this work is significantly to enhance the confidence with which a future comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty can be monitored.

The working paper we are presenting today as document CD/935 contains a brief summary of recent developments in the Norwegian seismic verification programme. The paper outlines the results of the operation of the two regional arrays in Norway, NORESS in southern Norway and ARCESS in northern Norway. These two arrays incorporate the most recent achievements in seismology and have shown outstanding capabilities in detecting small seismic events, both at close distances and in remote areas. This underlines the importance of the Norwegian proposal that the global network should, in so far as practicable, emcompass small-aperture seismic arrays. In addition, the working paper deals with the Second Technical Test which will be conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts, views on an integrated processing system for networks of arrays, and information on the new Norwegian National Data Centre.

As announced by State Secretary Hernes in April, Norway plans to arrange a workshop in Oslo in February 1990 on the subject of regional arrays and their use in seismic verification research. The workshop will be hosted by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORSAR.

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

Among others, experts from the Group of Scientific Experts will be invited to this workshop, which will address a number of the most important technical problems in the field of seismological verification. A report on the proceedings from the workshop will be made available to the Conference on Disarmament, and will also be distributed to the scientific community.

In closing, let me just reiterate the great interest of Norway in the efforts being made in this negotiating forum. We hope that the two documents we have presented today will constitute a useful contribution to the work of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Mr. Romero.

Mr. ROMERO (Chile) (translated from Spanish): At the outset of this first statement by Chile in the Conference on Disarmament, allow me first to congratulate you, Mr. President, and the distinguished representative of Mexico in his capacity as the previous President for the way in which each of you has conducted the work of the Conference during this second session of 1989. At the same time, I wish to thank all the delegations that made it possible at the beginning of the year for Chile to join the Conference as a non-member.

The decision of Chile to participate in these debates has its basis in the permanent respect my country has shown in its foreign conduct for fundamental legal principles such as non-intervention, self-determination of peoples and abstention from the threat or use of force in international relations. Accordingly, Chile favours peaceful settlement of all conflicts and considers that through disarmament it is possible to achieve the progress and well-being of mankind.

Moreover, my country notes with satisfaction that at the end of the 1980s, which were largely marked by stagnation, not to say setbacks, in virtually every area related to disarmament, there has taken shape a promising process affording a real and concrete chance of maintaining peace and security and international justice. That is an encouraging result of the steps taken by many States to re-establish mutual confidence between the various members of the international community. An eminent role has been played in this respect by the great Powers, which, in a renewed spirit of bilateralism, have reached important agreements that have helped to form the new climate in which present-day international relations are developing.

All of this, in addition to gratifying us and filling us with optimism, gives us cause for thought in view of the virtually unique opportunity of making progress in solving the varied and important problems that we still face in the sphere of disarmament. Therefore, my country believes that the bilateralism to which I have referred should be accompanied by renewed impetus in the multilateral negotiations, since these are the ones which, with no discrimination or objectionable exceptions, can succeed in representing the overall interests of the members of the world community.

(Mr. Romero, Chile)

In this regard, Chile reaffirms the urgent need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, and it is this Conference that constitutes the most suitable forum for discharging that important function. Hence our interest in being present in these negotiations and our willingness to co-operate in all initiatives that may require our support; as of now we place ourselves at the disposal of the Bureau and the chairmen of the various working groups, the secretariat and the other delegations here present to co-operate in all relevant matters.

Unfortunately, for financial reasons closely linked to our position as a developing country, we cannot have the same kind of delegation to the Conference that many other countries do. But that will not be an obstacle to our expressing our views and presenting for the consideration of the Conference working papers that we consider capable of contributing to the analysis of the various items on our agenda as we have already done with respect to the item on outer space. Along with this we are training officials in specialized areas and that is why we wish to make special mention of the opportunity given to one of them this year to participate in the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme.

The new atmosphere I have referred to has also had a positive influence at the Latin American regional level. Our peoples and Governments have been able to see that disarmament and peace can be achieved if there is real political will on the part of the decision-makers. But it is not enough for international agreements to increase security and guarantee peace. Chile believes further that the substantial financial resources released by these agreements should be oriented towards international co-operation, especially towards the developing countries which today are facing extremely grave problems of indebtedness and economic stagnation. Measures of such a nature would contribute to laying the foundation for real solidarity and international justice.

Allow me in the following minutes to express my country's general views on various matters on the agenda for the Conference.

Firstly, the nuclear danger, by its nature and the risk it involves, should have a prime place within the negotiations in this forum. My country has resolutely supported the agreements reached by the two major military Powers culminating in the signing in December 1987 of the Treaty on the elimination of shorter-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. It has also supported the negotiations on reducing strategic weapons. We think that initiatives of this nature not only help to reduce the risk of a world-wide conflagration but also strengthen international confidence and make possible concrete steps towards the limitation of conventional weapons. In this respect, we view positively the development there has been in the concept of "strategic deterrence", which was basically being used as a valid argument for the qualitative and quantitative improvement of the capacity of weapons, with the consequent untrammelled arms race between the said Powers.

(Mr. Romero, Chile)

As to the demilitarization of outer space, my country favours the complete elimination of every type of weapon, whether nuclear or not. In this respect, it should be noted that Chile signed the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in 1963 and is therefore subject to its provisions. We have not signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, because we do not agree with the formula agreed for verification, but we do undoubtedly uphold the lofty aims that were taken into account in concluding it in 1971.

For its part, the conventional arms race is of deep concern to us. This applies in particular to the nuclear countries, which, being unable to use those weapons, have proceeded with sophisticated technological advances in conventional weapons, attaining a high degree of efficiency that has at the same time entailed an extremely costly arms race. Moreover, the competition between the major Powers has spread to the rest of the developed countries, a process in which the less developed countries have subsequently become involved.

The possibilities of moving forward on the road to disarmament are, then, negatively affected by this competition, which has both qualitative and quantitative aspects, since the decisive factor in the forecasting of possible future conflicts is the search for more efficient military technology and that in turn brings about premature obsolescence of military technology.

We therefore believe that greater emphasis must be placed on the adoption of concrete measures to limit the qualitative aspect of the arms race. We also feel that, to succeed in stopping the arms race in qualitative terms, the work should be carried out within a framework that guarantees the security of States without forgetting their right to national and collective self-defence as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

I have left for the end of this statement a brief analysis of the question of chemical weapons, which has taken on vital importance in this Conference and is currently the subject of discussion in the plenary. The relevant Ad Hoc Committee has achieved progress that is insufficient in the light of the mandate conferred upon it by the Final Declaration adopted by the special conference on chemical weapons held in Paris last January. Chile took part in that meeting because it is convinced that chemical weapons must be prohibited definitively and eliminated as soon as possible in view of their particularly cruel toxic and environmental effects, their indiscriminate nature, the difficulty or impossibility of controlling their spread or direction and the risk of their use by terrorists or irresponsible persons.

Moreover, the mere suspicion that a State possesses chemical weapons immediately creates in other States a perception of a threat that promotes the escalation of mistrust and the heightening of international tension.

It is not our intention to engage in a detailed technical study of the draft convention the Conference is negotiating, but we believe that the future treaty, as well as guaranteeing the establishment of effective, universal,

(Mr. Romero, Chile)

mandatory, equitable and non-discriminatory verification machinery, should be sufficiently explicit about the point that the inspections necessary to prevent chemical weapons production should not constitute any obstacle to the development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes or a pretext for action having other ends. Inspection must, moreover, be harmoniously combined with State sovereignty.

Similarly, it should be laid down that States that use chemicals, even for purposes not prohibited by the convention, will be subject to a régime of strict liability, whether the harm that may be caused is direct, indirect or delayed. There should also be rules to cover the problem of transboundary pollution which, in the event that it occurs, should be subject to the principle that national territory cannot be used to the detriment of third States. Finally, consideration should be given to aspects such as the commitment of all parties to destroy the chemical weapons in their possession or under their control and the establishment of a more precise framework for the use of chemicals in the maintenance of public order within each State. This concept must be more clearly defined in order not to leave the door open for the use of certain substances which, while not lethal, can have extremely injurious consequences for people's health. It is urgent to redouble the efforts to reach definitive agreements in this sphere as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I have no other speakers listed to address the Conference today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? That does not seem to be the case.

I have requested the secretariat to circulate today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the chairmen of subsidiary bodies have been consulted. The timetable is merely indicative and we may change it if the need arises. On that understanding, I propose that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

Distinquished delegates, as today's meeting is the last plenary meeting for the month of July, allow me to make a brief concluding statement in my capacity as President of the Conference, at the end of the presidency of Mongolia for this month.

As you are aware, I have had consultations during July on various issues pertaining to organizational arrangements for agenda items 1, 2, 3 and 7 as well as to the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament and expansion of its membership.

I should like to mention especially the on going consultations with a view to facilitating progress on item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". As you will recall, on 6 July I stressed the importance of the efforts undertaken by Ambassador Yamada of Japan and encouraged him to proceed with his informal individual consultations.

(The President)

Although differences still exist, it seems to me that at last we are close to developing an adequate and acceptable organizational arrangement for consideration of this agenda item. In their plenary statements during the month of July a number of delegations touched on this vital issue and expressed individual and group positions of States. I do hope that Ambassador Yamada will continue his consultations and I wish him every success in his endeavours.

As regards the consultations on how to deal with agenda items 2, 3 and 7, it has unfortunately not been possible so far to reach agreement on these questions. I think, however, that it might be worth while for us to look again, in the case of agenda item 2, to the 1987 arrangement. As you may recall, during that annual session, we were able usefully to discuss matters relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

I also held consultations with the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees concerning the time-frame for submission of the various sections of the annual report. It was emphasized that reports of the subsidiary bodies would have to be submitted for processing in a gradual way so as to avoid delays in documentation. Accordingly a schedule for the submission of draft reports was adopted. I am sure that the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees will make every effort to meet this schedule.

The Conference also held an informal meeting to consider further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, in response to the invitation addressed to it by the Preparatory Committee of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Sea-bed Treaty. I believe that the discussion was useful and provided a good opportunity for those addressing the issues to present their views on such an important question.

A number of delegations, while stressing the pivotal role of the Conference on Disarmament, expressed their concern regarding the credibility of this forum in view of the gap between the declared objectives and the results achieved. I cannot but share this concern. The question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament thus deserves our serious consideration.

The remaining month before the end of this year's session should be used to the fullest for the search of appropriate solutions to the above-mentioned outstanding issues. I likewise hope that the subsidary bodies which will be working during August will redouble their efforts in order to accomplish more substantive work during that month.

I wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to all delegations for their kind support and co-operation, which made my task easier. This month has been, for me personally, a memorable and highly rewarding one. I wish success to my successor, Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, and to assure him of my delegation's full co-operation.

(The President)

I would also like to thank most sincerely the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, for their co-operation and invaluable assistance. My thanks go to the other members of the secretariat and the interpreters, translators and staff members of Conference Services for their dedication and assistance.

That concludes my closing statement.

Before adjourning, I should like to recall that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet immediately after the plenary in this conference room.

As there is no other business, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 1 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.522
1 August 1989

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 1 August 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. El Ghali Benhima (Morocco)

GE.89-62874/1268a

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 522nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

My country has always attached special importance to disarmament. Today this importance is reflected in an initiative taken by His Majesty King Hassan II, who wished to mark Morocco's assumption of the presidency of this Conference formally by addressing a message to it. Consequently, I have the great honour to read it to you:

(continued in Arabic)

"On the occasion of Morocco's assumption of the presidency of your distinguished Conference during this month, we have pleasure in sending you this message to express the esteem that we feel for the ongoing efforts that you are making to achieve the objectives to which the international community is aspiring in the field of disarmament.

"The task entrusted to your Conference, as the sole international body assigned to conduct multilateral negotiations, is undoubtedly a major responsibility in view of the ramifications of disarmament issues and their close bearing on the questions of international security and development.

"No one can contest the extreme importance that all Governments, regardless of their political and economic ideologies, should attach to the question of the security of their peoples. However, this should not blind us to an equally important fact, the truth of which has been borne out by international experience in the field of disarmament, particularly during the last three decades, namely the evident fact that every advance in weapons technology increases the sense of uneasiness and the feeling that there is a need to acquire more weapons.

"This obvious fact should induce us to abandon the dictum that intensive armament is the best guarantee of the security of States and, consequently, should prompt us to seek not only arms control but also full and comprehensive disarmament.

"Quite apart from the fact that the volume of weaponry in the world has today reached a level which makes it impossible for any belligerent to gain a clear victory over his opponent, the devastation that would result from the use of the stockpiled weapons, and particularly nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons of mass destruction, places us under an obligation to avert the danger of extinction of the human race.

"We were delighted to learn that, at the Geneva summit conference in November 1985, the two super-Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, had mutually agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should never be fought.

(The President)

"We are aware of the technical complexities of disarmament negotiations, connected with the precise assessment of the various types of weapons in the possession of the parties and the verification measures needed to ensure respect for agreements in this field. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that a demonstration of political will by all the parties and the creation of a climate of mutual trust among them constitute the fundamental requirements for the removal of the obstacles impeding general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

"The agreement on intermediate-range missiles that was concluded in December 1987 between the United States of America and the Soviet Union offers cogent proof of the ability of the two parties to overcome many of the technical difficulties.

"In this connection, we wish to commend the endeavours made and the initiatives taken during the past four years. The resumption of negotiations between the two super-Powers on the reduction of strategic weapons and underground nuclear tests, as well as the negotiations on conventional arms in Vienna, the measures taken at the Stockholm Conference and the results of the work of the Madrid Conference within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, truly constitute important steps that have opened broad horizons and created a new dynamism which will have a positive effect in enhancing all international relations.

"It is our fervent hope that your Conference, which includes all international political tendencies, in addition to the five permanent members of the Security Council, will be able to take advantage of this new climate in the near future, since it now has no excuse to continue in the state of barrenness that has characterized its work during the last decade. Your Conference, which has formulated a realistic and positive 10-point programme, should certainly be able to achieve the progress that the international community expects of it.

"No one is unaware of the extent and importance of the material and human resources from which mankind could benefit as a result of the adoption of practical measures to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament. If we recall that more than $1,000 billion is spent every year on the arms race, we will be able to visualize the number of projects that could be implemented in all fields by diverting part of the resources released for the benefit of development.

"In our view, the concept of development includes helping the countries of the third world to overcome the various socio-economic problems with which they are beset, and averting all the dangers that are threatening the human race. Mankind is today waging a battle of a type that it has not previously known. The new epidemics that have begun to spread in many regions, in addition to the previously known epidemics that have not yet been totally eliminated, the impending environmental dangers and the multitude of social problems with which we are faced all constitute challenges that force us to take a broader view of security to encompass the health, intellectual and environmental security of mankind.

(The President)

"Accordingly, it is evident that the question of disarmament is a matter of concern to the whole world, since the continuation of the arms race would threaten the security of mankind and deprive it of extensive resources that could be used for purposes of development. This is why the international community has entrusted the United Nations with the central role and the primary responsibility in the field of disaramament. We are confident that, through concerted endeavours by all the parties, our Organization will be able to discharge this task in the most effective manner.

"In conclusion, we wish to affirm that our Kingdom, which had the honour to become a member of your distinguished Conference in 1979, is committed to a diligent and responsible endeavour, with the other members of the international community, to achieve full and comprehensive disarmament in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the programme of action contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

"We pray Almighty God to bless your work and grant you success in your endeavours."

(continued in French)

So reads the message sent by His Majesty King Hassan II to the members of this Conference.

As you know, today the host country is celebrating its national day: 1 August. On behalf of the Conference, I should like to express our sincere congratulations to the delegation which represents Switzerland in our Conference, and at the same time pass to it our wishes for prosperity. I would also like to thank our Swiss colleagues for the efficient way in which they perform their functions as hosts to the Conference.

I cannot begin my term of office without paying tribute, on your behalf, to my predecessors in the presidency during this session - Ambassadors Pugliese of Italy, Yamada of Japan, Bullut of Kenya, Robles of Mexico and Bayart of Mongolia. I hope they will take it as a mark of our consideration and our gratitude for the quality of their personal contributions to the work of this Conference. I would like to take this opportunity to request the delegation of Mexico, on behalf of all the members of the Conference, to pass to our most senior colleague, Ambassador García Robles, our wishes for a prompt recovery.

Taking up the presidency of the Conference is not only a heavy responsibility for the person occupying the Chair, but also an appeal, an appeal for support and co-operation from all the members. The collective motivation in the quest for necessary compromise and the commitment to accomplish a major undertaking together give me grounds for thinking that your support and your assistance will not be lacking. In this context, it will be agreed that agenda item 1, concerning a nuclear test ban, has the greatest call on our attention. Unfortunately, the consultations carried out by successive Presidents of the Conference, which are continuing actively through the efforts of Ambassador Yamada to identify the terms of a mandate for an

(The President)

ad hoc committee on this item, have not yet produced any results. It is true that divergences arise when the demands of some parties come up against the specific political preoccupations of others. In such circumstances dialogue and negotiation constitute the best path to the common goal. The readiness of the parties to acknowledge one another's positions and work together is a prerequisite for a fair solution to the difficulties. In this context, I wish to urge Ambassador Yamada to do his utmost to achieve a convergence of views on the mandate in question. It is my hope that, thanks to his wisdom, his efforts will be crowned with success. The Chair hastens to assure him of its readiness to assist at any time.

Other consultations are also to be held with the aim of seeking the most appropriate way for the Conference to tackle items 2 and 3, which deal respectively with nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. It seems to me that the Conference desires a speeding up of the negotiations on chemical weapons and the intensification of work on radiological weapons and outer space. The adoption of a report by the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances is a good omen for the other committees. Similarly, the Conference wishes finally to adopt the comprehensive programme of disarmament, in accordance with the recommendation set out in resolution 43/78 K. Since the Conference has on several occasions found it impossible to comply with the deadlines laid down by the General Assembly, it must do all in its power to secure the adoption of the programme at the end of this session.

There is no doubt that we are all aware of the need to accomplish our task, the extent of which no longer needs underlining, within the deadlines laid down. We are to adopt our report on Thursday 31 August, the date of the closure of the present session. We will all see to it that this imperative is respected. The Chair, which has taken the measure of the task with which it has been entrusted, is mobilized in the service of the Conference, which it assures of its availability and dedication. It knows that it can count on everyone to contribute to the success of our work. The support of the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and all the members of the secretariat will, I am sure, be most valuable.

Today the Conference begins its consideration of item 6 on its agenda, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who so wishes may raise any matter relating to the work of the Conference. I have no speakers on my list for today. However, in accordance with normal practice in the Conference, I shall ask whether there are any delegations wishing to take the floor. I give the floor to the representative of Switzerland.

Mr. OCHSNER (Switzerland) (translated from French): I thank you for your warm wishes addressed to my country on the occasion of our national day. I should also like to thank the Chairman of the committee on chemical weapons, Mr. Lüdeking of the Federal Republic of Germany, who, out of consideration for this day, has cancelled this afternoon's meeting, a gesture by a neighbour that we fully appreciate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Switzerland for his kind words. Are there any other speakers who would like to take the floor? It seems not. I would like to inform the Conference that the Group of 21 has presented draft mandates for ad hoc committees under agenda item 2 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". The documents in question were distributed yesterday and today in the delegations' pigeon-holes in the official languages with the symbols CD/819/Rev.1 and CD/515/Rev.5. I should like to inform you that the Group of 21 has asked me to put these draft mandates before the Conference for decision. The Group of 21 has also asked me to begin with the draft relating to agenda item 2, contained in document CD/819/Rev.1, during next Thursday's plenary meeting. In keeping with our usual practice, I shall suspend the meeting after the speakers on the list have spoken, and convene an informal meeting to determine whether there is consensus on the proposed draft mandate. Immediately afterwards, as requested by the Group ov 21, we shall resume the plenary meeting so that the Conference officially has before it for decision the text issued with the symbol CD/819/Rev.1. The same procedure will be followed with the draft mandate under agenda item 3, contained in document CD/515/Rev.5, at the plenary meeting to be held on Tuesday 8 August.

There are no other matters to be considered today, and I now intend to close the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 3 August 1989 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.